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Fifteen Minutes of Shame:
The Growing Notoriety of
Grand Corruption
By MARY EVANS WEBSTER*
I. Introduction
Corruption in all its manifest forms gnaws at, undermines, and
contradicts all the democratic elements. It is underserved, unfair,
unjust, and immoral benefit derived from positions of public trust
and responsibility used for sleaze and unworthy actions
Ten years ago, corruption was considered incident to doing
business internationally and, for better or worse, an inescapable
reality.2  Today, corruption is considered to be one of the
fundamental obstacles to development and an enemy that must be
defeated Accordingly, the international community is focused, like
never before, on efforts to reduce corruption as an essential
component of poverty eradication.4
* J.D. candidate, May 2008, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. I
would like to thank all of my colleagues on the Hastings International and
Comparative Law Review for their support and assistance with this note; Professor
Joel Paul for helping me pursue my interest in international law; and Professor John
Hatchard for providing me with further insight into how to use the law to fight grand
corruption.
1. Gerald E. Caiden, Corruption and Democracy, in WHERE CORRUPTION
LIVEs 227 (Gerald E. Caiden, O.P. Dwivedi & Joseph Jabbra eds., 2001).
2. Demetrios Argyriades, The International Anticorruption Campaigns: Whose
Ethics?, in WHERE CORRUPTION LIVES 217 (Gerald E. Caiden, O.P. Dwivedi &
Joseph Jabbra eds., 2001).
3. See USAID Anticorruption Strategy, available at <http://www.usaid.gov/
ourworkldemocracy-and-govemance/publications/pdfs/ac strategy-final.pdf>
(visited Mar. 24, 2008).
4. See OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Arg.-Brazil-Bulgaria-Chile-Slovak Rep., Dec.
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Unfortunately, many reforms implemented to fight corruption
have yet to significantly reduce corruption.5 In May 2005, the World
Bank released a study which declared that, between 1996 and 2004,
the quality of governance deteriorated in as many African countries
as in which the quality of governance improved.6 Despite billions of
dollars expended on rule of law and good governance programs,
corruption maintains a tight grasp on many developing countries.
This note will examine grand corruption, provide a survey of
recent efforts to combat such flagrant abuses of power, and assess the
relationship between grand corruption and international legal
development. Part II draws a distinction between administrative and
grand corruption and examines one of the most egregious cases of
grand corruption and kleptocracy from the latter half of the twentieth
century. Part III addresses recent efforts of the United Nations, the
World Bank, and the United States to fight grand corruption. Part IV
explores the relationship between grand corruption and legal
development. It looks at the relationship between law and politics in
fighting grand corruption and addresses the difficulty of using
development aid to fight grand corruption. Lastly, Part V examines a
number of legal approaches to fighting grand corruption.
II. What Grand Corruption Looks Like
In order to understand current worldwide efforts to combat
corruption, an important distinction must be made. For a number of
years, international development organizations operated on the
theory that institutional and organizational reform combined with
public education would successfully eliminate corruption.7
Accordingly, the vast majority of anticorruption resources and efforts
have gone to fight administrative corruption. Administrative
corruption is the payment of small-scale bribes to mid- and low-level
government officials such as police officers, customs personnel,
18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (1998); see OAS Convention Against Corruption, March 26,
1996, 35 I.L.M. 724 (1996).
5. See generally MICHAEL JOHNSTON, SYNDROMES OF CORRUPTION: WEALTH,
POWER AND DEMOCRACY (2005).
6. Sharon LaFraniere, The Hidden Scourge: Wrestling with Corruption Africa
Tackles Graft, With Billions in Aid in Play, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2005, at Al.
7. Steven E. Hendrix, New Approaches to Addressing Corruption in the
Context of US Foreign Assistance with Examples from Latin America and the
Caribbean, 12 Sw. J. L. & TRADE AM. 1, 12 (2005).
[Vol. 31:2
Fifteen Minutes of Shame
medical doctors, and teachers.8
Today, a shift in focus has occurred, and the international
community has begun to recognize the harm caused by grand
corruption. Grand corruption, also known as political corruption, is
classified as large bribes given in connection with major interactions,
such as large infrastructure projects or arms sales, and the abuse of
political power to extract and accumulate for private gain.9 The key
difference between the two types of corruption is that "administrative
corruption reflects specific weaknesses within different systems, while
grand corruption involves the distortion and exploitation of entire
systems for the benefit of private interests."'" Grand corruption is
often associated with the massive redirection of public funds for the
private use of the political elite." The most notorious culprits have
embezzled billions of dollars from their countries for their own
personal wealth accumulation.
Transparency International, one of the preeminent international
organizations dedicated to fighting corruption, has compiled a list of
the most flagrant benefactors of grand corruption. Each of the
leaders on the list used his position and power to amass huge amounts
of wealth, in turn denying his citizens access to development funds
and the benefits of private investments in their respective countries.
Mohamed Suharto, the president of Indonesia from 1967 to 1998, is
the most egregious offender, having embezzled an estimated $15
billion to $35 billion.'3
The World Bank ("Bank") estimates that up to 30 percent, or
$10 billion, of its loans to Indonesia were lost to corruption during the
Suharto regime.'4 It is not hard to understand why development is
8. Claes Sandgren, Combating Corruption: The Misunderstood Role of Law, 39
INT'L LAW. 717, 723 (2005).
9. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center, What is Political Corruption?,
available at <http://www.u4.no/themes/political-
corruption/introduction.cfm#definitions> (visited Mar. 24, 2008).
10. Hendrix, supra note 7, at 4.
11. Id.
12. Transparency International, Plundering Politicians and Bribing
Multinationals Undermine Economic Development, available at <http://
www.transparency.org/newsroom/
latest-news/press-releases/2004/20040325_gcrrelaunch > (visited Mar. 27, 2008).
13. Id.
14. Global Integrity, Indonesia Timeline, available at
<http://www.globalintegrity.org/reports/2006/INDONESIA/timeline.cfm> (visited
Mar. 24, 2008).
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impeded by corruption when a president has stolen billions of dollars
from his citizens. Suharto resigned from his presidency in 1998 in
response to mounting opposition to his rule. 5 In 2000, he was
charged by the Indonesian government with embezzling more than
$600 million. 6 All of the charges against Suharto were formally
dropped in 2006 due to his failing health; Suharto never appeared in
court regarding the corruption allegations. 7
While administrative corruption may be more visible on a day-
to-day basis, grand corruption is utterly devastating to state
development." Grand corruption robs citizens of access to necessary
funds and exacerbates state poverty.'9 It was believed that fighting
small-scale bribery and increasing public awareness regarding
corruption is enough to change a country. This idea has proven to be
a false hope. International efforts to fight corruption must emphasize
grand corruption in order to be successful.
III. Current Strategies for Fighting Grand Corruption
Recent changes to international aid strategies and developments
in global cooperation offer insight into the potential to fight grand
corruption. The last ten years have shown dramatic increases in
worldwide recognition of the problems of corruption. Developments
in the past five years are particularly telling in regards to the obstacles
to and opportunities for battling grand corruption.
A. The United Nations
In December 2003, United Nations General Assembly adopted
the United Nations Convention against Corruption ("UNCAC").'°
To date, the Convention has 140 signatories.' The UNCAC is the
15. President Suharto Resigns, BBC NEWS, May 21, 1998, available at
<news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/indonesia/latestnews/98063.stm>.
16. Peter Gelling, World Briefing Asia: Indonesia: Charges Dropped Against
Ailing Suharto, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2006, at A6.
17. Id
18. USAID Anticorruption Strategy, supra note 3, at 8.
19. Id. at 1.
20. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Fact Sheet 1 - The United
Nations Convention against Corruption, available at:
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/
treaties/UNCAC/COSP/session2/Factsheetl-UNCAC.pdf> (visited Mar. 24, 2008).
21. Id.
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first binding international agreement on corruption. The
Convention represents the result of serious efforts to get the global
community to come together and address specific aspects of
corruption that impede development and exacerbate poverty.
Significantly, the UNCAC distinguishes itself from other
international conventions in that it recognizes that the problem of
corruption is more extensive than bribery and that other aspects of
corruption must be addressed in order to make global efforts
effective.2 In the preamble to the Convention, there is specific
reference to the need to fight grand corruption. The signatories
declare themselves to be "[c]onvinced that the illicit acquisition of
personal wealth can be particularly damaging to democratic
institutions, national economies and the rule of law, [and]
[d]etermined to prevent, detect and deter in a more effective manner
international transfers of illicitly acquired assets and to strengthen
international cooperation in asset recovery.,
24
One of the most contentious and important aspects of the
UNCAC is its provisions regarding asset recovery. Asset recovery is
a major issue for countries where grand corruption has resulted in the
loss of millions of dollars that could be used for poverty alleviation
and development of civil services. Leaders involved in the
negotiations for the UNCAC recognized that asset recovery was
fundamental to the Convention and a significant indicator of the
political will of states to truly work together to fight grand
corruption.25 Ultimately, an entire chapter of the Convention was
devoted to asset recovery.
In December 2006, the Conference of the States Parties to the
UNCAC held its first session in Amman, Jordan.26 In a resolution,
the States reconfirmed their commitment to asset recovery and
declared asset recovery to be one of the primary objectives of the
UNCAC.27 The resolution called for the establishment of an interim
22. Philippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: Global
Achievement or Missed Opportunity?, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 191,191 (2005).
23. Id. at 210.
24. Preamble, UNCAC, available at <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/
crime/convention-corruption/signing/Convention-e.pdf> (visited Mar. 24, 2008).
25. Webb, supra note 22, at 208.
26. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, CAC/COSP 1 Resolutions and
Decisions, available at <http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/CAC-COSP-
sessionl-resolutions.html> (visited Mar. 24, 2008).
27. Id.
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open-ended intergovernmental working group to continue global
cooperation in asset recovery; there was particular emphasis on the
importance of the exchange of information, and "with a view to
tracing financial flows linked to corruption, seizing assets derived
from corruption and returning such assets."
Not surprisingly, the asset recovery component of the
Convention has been met with mixed reviews. Many considered the
provisions to be groundbreaking.29 Importantly, there are mandatory
provisions which empower states to recover property through civil
action or international cooperation.30 On the other hand, some of the
most important provisions were made optional. Specifically, states
need only consider establishing financial disclosure systems."
Furthermore, the enforcement of the Convention in international law
remains largely incidental to international cooperation. While the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires states that ratify
treaties to oblige by the treaty under the doctrine of pacta sunt
servanda, no reliable body of enforcement exists in international
law.32
B. The World Bank
The World Bank is one of the global leaders in the fight against
corruption and was the first development finance organization to
implement a comprehensive anticorruption regime.33 Since 1996, the
Bank has changed its function from self-described apolitical institute
to a bank that actively supports the improvement of public institutes
and the strengthening of governments.34 "Between 2000 and 2004,
lending to promote economic reforms fell by 14 percent a year, but
lending to improve governance rose by 11 percent. In the 2004 fiscal
28. Id
29. Webb, supra note 22, at 209.
30. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, chapter V art. 53 and 54,
adopted Oct. 31, 2003, (Resolution 58/4).
31. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, chapter V art. 52(5) and
(6), adopted Oct. 31, 2003, (Resolution 58/4).
32. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 36,May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S 331; see also Webb, supra note 22, at 222.
33. Parthapratim Chanda, The Effectiveness of the World Bank's Anti-
Corruption Efforts: Current Legal and Structural Obstacles and Uncertainties, 32
DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 315, 318 (2004).
34. A Regime Changes: Paul Wolfowitz at the World Bank, THE ECONOMIST,
June 2, 2005.
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year the Bank committed 25 percent of its lending to law and public
administration."35 The Bank now considers corruption to be one of
the greatest obstacles to economic and social development and has
identified five elements of an effective anticorruption strategy:
increase political accountability, strengthen civil society participation,
create a competitive private sector, implement institutional restraints
on power, and improve public sector management.36
In September 2006, the World Bank released a new proposed
strategy on governance and anticorruption at its annual meeting."
The strategy explicitly recognizes the problem of grand corruption
and notes that it is harder to address than administrative corruption.38
Like the UNCAC, the Bank lists technical assistance for asset
recovery as fundamental to its global approach.39  In fact, in
September 2007, the World Bank announced the Stolen Asset
Recovery (StAR) Initiative, a joint project between the Bank and the
UN. The four primary tasks of the project are: to build institutional
capacity in developing countries, to strengthen the integrity of
financial markets (especially by assuring that financial centers are in
compliance with anti-money laundering legislation), to assist the asset
recovery process of developing countries, and to monitor the use of
recovered assets."n Hopefully, cooperation between the two entities
will increase the success rate of asset recovery efforts.
C. Millennium Challenge Corporation and the United States
Agency for International Development
During the presidency of George W. Bush, U.S. foreign aid has
undergone significant changes. In 2004, Congress established the
Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a government-owned
corporation responsible for managing the Millennium Challenge
35. Id
36. The World Bank, Anti-corruption, available at <http://go.worldbank.org/
EWYJ9SL5X0> (visited Mar. 24, 2008).
37. Staff of the World Bank, Strengthening Bank Group Engagement on
Governance and Anticorruption, Sept. 8, 2006, available at <http://
www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/comments/governancefeedback/
gacpaper.pdf>.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities, and Action
Plan, available at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/NEWS[Resources/Star-rep-
full.pdf> (visited Mar. 24, 2008).
2008]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Account (MCA).4 The MCC requires states to meet a set of
selection criteria in order to be eligible for funding through the
program. States must "demonstrate a commitment to policies that
promote political and economic freedom, investments in education
and health, control of corruption, and respect for civil liberties and
the rule of law by performing well on 16 different policy indicators. ,42
The MCC approach is a break from traditional U.S. foreign aid
projects, not only in its use of funding criteria but also in the way it
imagines the projects to be carried out. Rather than short-term
projects implemented by Washington consultants, the MCC permits
countries to plan and carry out larger projects themselves.43
Currently, forty-two countries are eligible for MCC funding." The
Bush Administration created the program as an alternative to the
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in
order to assure lawmakers that a $2 billion increase in foreign aid
would not be wasted on corrupt foreign officials.45
There are as many supporters of the program as there are critics.
Some development experts praise the program as necessary in order
to assure that aid money is not squandered away as it has been in the
past.46 Lawmakers and policy experts have not failed to make the
connection between generous foreign aid and the embezzlement of
millions of dollars by the political elite in some developing countries,
and have encouraged greater oversight of aid packages. On the other
hand, for some experts, the program is controversial, if not misguided.
Jeffrey Sachs, an economist from Columbia University, argues that
the MCC fails to contribute enough money to international aid and is
too narrow in the countries to which it will provide aid.47 As recently
as December 2007, the MCC continues to be criticized for its failure
to follow through on funding promises.'
41. Millennium Challenge Corporation, at <http://www.mcc.
gov/about/index.php> (visited Mar. 24,2008).
42. Millennium Challenge Corporation, Selection Criteria, available at
<http://www.mcc.gov/selection/index.php> (visited Mar. 24, 2008).
43. Celia Dugger, US. Agency's Slow Pace Endangers Foreign Aid, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 7, 2007.
44. Millennium Challenge Corporation, Countries, available at
<http://www.mcc.gov/countries/index.php> (visited Mar. 24, 2008).
45. Elizabeth Becker, With Record Rise in Foreign Aid Comes Change in How It
is Monitored, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7,2003, at 110.
46. Id
47. Jeffrey D. Sachs, Four Easy Pieces, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2005, at A15.
48. Dugger, supra note 43.
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The MCC has suffered a number of setbacks since its creation.
In June 2005, the first director of the MCC, Paul Applegarth, resigned
from his post after a lackluster job in the role.' 9 A few weeks later,
the leaders of five African states criticized the United States for
excessive delays in delivery of grant funds.' The presidents of
Botswana, Ghana, Mozambique, Niger, and Namibia publicly
complained that "the bureaucracy and fine print of the program made
it nearly impossible for them to get aid."5' While Congress had at one
point appropriated $4.8 billion for the MCA, as of December 2007,
the agency had spent only $155 million.52
In January 2005, USAID produced a new strategy plan for
fighting corruption. In this report, USAID recognizes the need to
expand its efforts to include more focus on fighting grand
corruption. The agency claims that trying to fight corruption
without attacking grand corruption is more likely to result in
rearranging corruption than actually reducing it. 4 In the strategy
plan, USAID explicitly states that, in light of a new understanding of
the detrimental effects of grand corruption, development efforts will
now focus on countries which may suffer from administrative
corruption but have relatively lower levels of grand corruption.
In no uncertain terms, the U.S. government seems to be
suggesting it is less willing to send money to countries where the
leadership exacerbates corruption. At the very least, USAID is
putting significant effort into locating where the political will to fight
grand corruption lies in order to direct its development money to
projects that have the potential to effect change 6 Such a refocus of
efforts requires creating projects that resist manipulation by
government leaders and their cronies, by supporting decentralization
and increased economic competition and introducing targeted
49. Celia Dugger, Bush Aid Initiative for Poor Nations Faces Sharp Budget Cuts
and Criticism of SlowPace, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2005, at A12.
50. Id.
51. A Timely Departure, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005, at 411.
52. Dugger, supra note 43.
53. USAID Anticorruption Strategy, supra note 3, at 2.
54. Id. at 13.
55. Id. at 16.
56. Interview with Jason Schwarz, General Counsel, Senior Business
Development Associate, DPK Consulting (March 2007) (on file with the author).
DPK Consulting is a public sector management consulting firm that implements
democracy and governance projects in developing countries for USAID, World
Bank, and other clients.
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transparency and accountability reforms. 7
IV. Legal Development and Grand Corruption
A. The Relationship Between Legal Development and Politics
i. The United States
Since the 1990s, the international development community has
accepted corruption as a major impediment to international growth
and a problem that exacerbates poverty and inequality. 8 Rule of law
and good governance are buzz words that receive a good deal of use
in development circles. Seemingly, money invested in legal
frameworks to fight corruption and bring kleptocrats to justice would
be well spent. Unfortunately, grand corruption has a political
character that continues to shield it from legal attack. In some
instances, despite the United States' public opposition to grand
corruption, it still offers significant funding to countries known to be
systematically corrupt because other concerns, often political, are
deemed more important:
In a speech on August 10, 2006, President Bush announced his
"National Strategy to Internationalize Efforts Against Kleptocracy. '
In the words of the President: "High-level corruption by senior
government officials, or kleptocracy, is a grave and corrosive abuse of
power and represents the most invidious type of public corruption., 61
The strategy calls for the creation of a coalition of international
financial centers committed to denying access and financial safe
haven to kleptocrats. It also calls for the prosecution of foreign
corruption offenses and seizure of illicitly acquired assets, among
other initiatives.62
The public recognition that world leaders themselves impede
development and squander international aid is an important step.
57. Id.
58. See HEATHER MARQUETrE, CORRUPTION, POLITICS, AND DEVELOPMENT
(2003).
59. Schwarz Interview, supra note 56.
60. GEORGE W. BUSH, Fact Sheet: National Strategy to Internationalize Efforts
Against Kleptocracy; President's Statement Against Kleptocracy (August 10, 2006),
available at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/08/20060810-l.html>.
61. Id
62. Id.
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While this new policy effort sounds promising, there is reason to be
skeptical. Failure to recognize the problem and a shortage of
strategies to fight it are not the primary obstacles to eliminating grand
corruption. Rather, the challenges are incentive and lack of political
will.
This reality played out when the president of Kazakhstan,
Nursultan A. Nazarbayev, visited the United States in September
2006.63 Mr. Nazarbayev has been criticized for amassing a personal
fortune from lucrative oil deals at the expense of his citizenry." In
fact, he is an unindicted co-conspirator in one of the largest foreign
bribery cases ever brought in a U.S. court. 65 The defendant in the
case, James H. Giffen, an American merchant banker and a
consultant to the Kazakh government, has been accused of paying
more than $78 million in bribes to Mr. Nazarbayev and the head of
the Kazakhstan oil ministry.6 Federal prosecutors allege the Kazakh
leadership accepted the money for personal use, including the
purchase of expensive jewelry, speedboats, snowmobiles, and fur
coats.
67
Despite the Kazakh president's strong connection to these
accusations and Mr. Bush's declared devotion to prosecuting
kleptocrats, Mr. Nazarbayev was warmly received by the Bush
Administration and several prominent business people during his
visit.68 Kazakhstan is an important ally in the fight against terrorism
and a lucrative source of oil.69 Concerns of national security, strategic
political relationships, and access to oil all impact the United States'
will and ability to fight grand corruption. While the United States has
indicated a dedication to fighting grand corruption through a number
of policy and spending initiatives, political and economic realities can
supersede the priority of ending grand corruption and limit the role
the law is permitted to play.
63. Ron Stodghill, Oil, Cash and Corruption, N.Y. TIMES, November 5, 2006, at
31.
64. Id
65. Id
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id
69. Id
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ii. The World Bank
The nature of the political dilemma at the World Bank is distinct
from that which the United States faces. According to its bylaws, the
Bank is not permitted to take into account the "political character" of
the regimes it deals with.7' Until 1996, the Bank generally followed
this rule and did not factor the political variable into its lending
decisions." Furthermore, it did not engage in projects of a political
nature .72
When James Wolfensohn became president of the World Bank
in 1996, he made good governance and anticorruption top priorities
for the Bank. Nonetheless, even as World Bank projects have been
expanded over the last ten years to address rule of law and
governance concerns, the Bank has been reluctant to cut off funding
to states, even in light of widespread evidence of corruption.73 The
Bank "decries politics while conducting work that is overtly
political.
74
A not-so-quiet debate has been stirring within the World Bank
about whether or not to take grand corruption into account when
making future lending decisions.75 Paul Wolfowitz, the beleaguered
president of the World Bank who resigned in May 2007, made
battling graft his number one priority.76 In his first year as president
of the Bank, he canceled or suspended several loans, some of them to
powerful clients.77 His actions were controversial within the Bank and
angered many, who questioned both his motives and his approach.8
Robert Zoellick, Wolfowitz's successor, entered a World Bank
greatly shaken by the anticorruption strategy pursued by Wolfowitz.
Some Bank insiders hoped that Zoellick would be less preoccupied
with corruption - particularly Wolfowitz's plans to cut funding to
some countries accused of corruption. 9 While Zoellick remains
70. Double Edged-Sword; The Fight Against Corruption, THE ECONOMIST,
September 14, 2006, at 99.
71. A Regime Changes: Paul Wolfowitz at the World Bank, THE ECONOMIST,
June 2, 2005, at 81.
72. Marquette, supra note 58.
73. Chanda, supra note 33, at 347.
74. Marquette, supra note 58.
75. Id,
76. The World Bank. Just Saying No, THE ECONOMIST, March 2, 2006.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Steven R. Weisman, New World BankHead Will Continue Fight on
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committed to fighting corruption in World Bank projects, he also is
aware of the resistance among many at the Bank to put corruption
concerns ahead of poverty alleviation.80 In many ways, the World
Bank is caught in a predicament of priorities: Fight grand corruption
by holding governments accountable, or continue to support
economic development by making generous loans even in light of
evidence of grand corruption.
B. Obstacles to Legal Development in Light of Grand
Corruption
In 2003, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimated that
one-third of public investment within many Asia-Pacific countries was
being siphoned for corrupt use.' The ADB also noted that
corruption can cost a country up to 17 percent of its gross domestic
product, which essentially robs the population of resources to fight
poverty and implement development plans. The implication is that
international development aid to fund anticorruption efforts where
grand corruption is a serious problem is an inefficient use of
resources. Anticorruption efforts, which aim to foster positive
change, have the potential to do nothing more than create new
opportunities for corruption.83 The international community is left in
a seemingly lose-lose situation where money spent to fight corruption
is invested in and, in turn, lost to corruption, because heads of state
pocket the money instead of apply it accordingly.
Grand corruption is so much more difficult to fight than
administrative corruption, because there is no leadership to support
reform.' The leadership itself is the problem. This is to say, the
regimes the development community seeks to cooperate with in
implementing corruption reforms have no serious commitment to
seeing the reforms work, because they risk exposing their crimes.
On the other hand, abandoning corrupt states altogether is not
Corruption, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, June 26, 2007, at 9.
80. Id.
81. Geert H.P.B Van der Linden, Vice-President, Asian Development Bank,
Welcoming Remarks at the 4th Regional Anti Corruption Conference for Asia and
Pacific (Dec. 3, 2003), available at <http://www.adb.org/Media/Articles/2003/
3815_WelcomeRemarksGeertHPBVanDerLinden/>.
82. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES,
CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 179-80 (1999).
83. Johnston, supra note 5, at 196.
84. Schwarz interview, supra note 56.
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an option.8 "[P]olicies which try to isolate corrupt countries and
individuals from the international community encourage their rulers
to descend into paranoia and isolation .... ." and fail to help the
citizens, who are the real victims of grand corruption." Cutting off
development aid and permitting leaders to continue to exploit the
public sector for their own gain, thus deserting the citizens of
profoundly corrupt regimes, cannot be the solution.
Given this scenario, proactive international legal efforts, which
extend beyond administrative corruption to directly attack the
infrastructure that supports grand corruption, become imperative.
Development aid alone will never be successful in putting an end to
grand corruption. No effective way exists to make sure the aid is used
properly, oversight is difficult, and politics will always influence how
the world leaders will react to grand corruption within a specific
country. There must be significant legal ramifications for taking part
in or making any profit from grand corruption, completely
independent of political considerations.
V. Legal Approaches to Grand Corruption
A. National Regulations
Legal reform must come both from within corrupt countries and
in the form of international law. National laws that make it harder to
engage in grand corruption create an important foundation. But not
all national laws are created equally. Laws aimed at increasing
transparency, such as public procurement reforms, or strengthening
domestic prosecution and investigative bodies can easily be
manipulated in states with grand corruption."' Rather, emphasis
should be on reducing the state's concentration of political and
economic power through the implementation of laws that increase
economic competition and open the door to private sector
stakeholders.8 The private sector is in a unique position to use its
85. Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Challenge of Poor Governance and Corruption
(Copenhagen Consensus Challenge Paper, 2004), available at
<http://www.copenhagenconsensus.com/Files/
Filer/CC/Papers/Governance andCorruption_300404_(0.7MB-version).pdf>.
86. Id.
87. Schwarz interview, supra note 56.
88. Id.
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influence to insist on reforms which level the playing field."
Another approach to limiting highly centralized state power is to
bolster regional and local governments.Y This has the potential to
create new political forces, spread power away from the center, and
foster opposition and checks and balances.9 Of course, as with any
legal reforms, the strength of the laws themselves is crucial to making
improvements. "[Ploorly written laws that have ambiguities or
inconsistencies.., and make processes more complex and lengthy are
magnets for corrupt behavior."'  Laws must be straightforward, well
written, and drafted with an eye to limiting corruption. 3
B. International Responses
i. Asset Recovery Through Civil Suits
As discussed above, asset recovery is now focused on as one of
the most viable and effective responses to grand corruption. Asset
recovery requires action on behalf of the home country attempting to
recover the looted funds but quickly becomes an international effort
and typically requires cooperation and mutual assistance on behalf of
a number of states. The main theory behind the importance of asset
recovery is that by reclaiming the stolen money, the profit is taken
out of corruption.94 If corrupt officials know they will not be able to
hide and keep the money, the primary incentive behind looting state
funds is removed. Furthermore, through asset recovery, states have
the opportunity to get back some of the money they have lost and put
it to use in civil society.
Asset recovery through civil action avoids many of the problems
encountered in efforts to criminally prosecute corrupt leaders in their
home countries. Importantly, because it is a civil suit and there is no
need to obtain a criminal conviction, the burden of proof is lower.95
89. See Ethan S. Burger & Mary S. Holland, Why the Private Sector is Likely to
Lead the Next Stage in the Global Fight Against Corruption, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L. J.
45 (2006).
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Establishing jurisdiction in a range of venues is easier (typically
extending to countries where the stolen money has traveled), and so
the case need not be brought in the home state of the official.96
Another important attribute of civil suits is that, even if presidential
immunity extends to civil suits under the laws of the kleptocrat's
country, an action still may be brought against friends and family,
who are often closely involved in corruption schemes.' Lastly, civil
suits may be brought even if a former president is deceased or has
fled to another country.'
Of course, asset recovery is not without its flaws. Efforts to
recover lost funds require huge resources of time and money in order
to trace the assets and carry out proper investigations and civil suits.99
Cooperation and mutual assistance among states also are essential to
guarantee that efforts to locate the money will not be blocked or
resisted by financial institutions. Furthermore, politics, both internal
and international, always threaten to limit the willingness of parties to
pursue a civil action.'" Whether or not these obstacles can be
overcome will determine whether asset recovery will be successful in
an individual case of grand corruption.
Prior to 1998, efforts to recover stolen assets from corrupt
officials were notably unsuccessful. 1' Since then, two well-publicized
cases have helped to garnish public awareness and international
support for asset recovery. In 1999, after the death of General Sani
Abacha, the newly elected president of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo,
launched an effort to recover millions of dollars stolen by Abacha.' °2
Obasanjo requested assistance from those states where the money
was being held in bank accounts. Ultimately Switzerland,
Luxembourg, and Liechtenstein proved to possess the greatest
concentration of Nigeria's stolen money, and they cooperated
extensively to help return the money. After several years of
investigation, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland oversaw the
return of nearly half a billion dollars to Nigeria. 3 The case proved to
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the international community that asset recovery, through
international cooperation, is at least feasible."'
Another major landmark case, requiring cooperation and mutual
assistance from a number of states and banks, was finally settled in
2007. Last year, the High Court of England and Wales found that the
former president of Zambia, Frederick Chiluba, and a number of his
close associates had participated in a conspiracy to defraud the
Republic of Zambia and had breached a duty of fiduciary
responsibility to the country.' 5 The High Court found Chiluba guilty
of stealing more than $46 million.1 6 Immediately following the ruling,
the attorney general of Zambia initiated proceedings in Zambia to
enforce the ruling against Chiluba's property in the country.l 7
This case sets an important precedent in overcoming some of the
fundamental challenges in asset recovery described above. Despite
the enormity of the task, the legal endeavor undertaken by the
Zambian government to track down the looted money was successful.
Furthermore, the level of cooperation demonstrated to trace and
freeze the assets proves a willingness and preparedness of states to
actively support asset recovery. Asset recovery has its supporters and
its detractors, but it is undoubtedly one of the most promising
methods of both discouraging grand corruption and returning stolen
money to its rightful owners.
A Bank Regulations
Closely connected to efforts to promote asset recovery is the
issue of money laundering and the role of international financial
institutions in facilitating grand corruption. The international
community must begin to take greater responsibility for preventing
the embezzlement of state funds that have been granted to a country
from an international development organization or earned through
the private sector. Banks too often have turned a blind eye to, or in
some cases, facilitated embezzlement of millions of dollars by corrupt
leaders." The UNCAC calls attention to the failures of international
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banks to implement their own policies regarding obligations to verify
background information on bank clients in order to prevent money
laundering.'" As countries grow weary of investing development aid
in countries with corrupt leadership, the obvious question is, how
does the developed world facilitate the accumulation of such massive
wealth?
Prior to 9/11, efforts to increase the responsibility of banks to
monitor their clients were strongly and successfully rejected by
financial institutions.'10 Since 9/11, however, regulations that were
passed to prevent terrorists from using international financial
institutions to launder money and fund attacks have had important
repercussions for grand corruption. In particular, "know your
customer" regulations require banks to "ascertain the identity of the
nominal or beneficial owners of, and the source of funds deposited
into, the account, and report any suspicious transactions..'.. These
heightened requirements have the potential to make it harder for
kleptocrats to hide stolen funds. Furthermore, they place more onus
on banks to accept responsibility for facilitating corruption, and they
limit banks' ability to shield themselves with ignorance.'
To be sure, kleptocrats are sophisticated money launderers and
have likely become experts at avoiding detection in most cases."'
Money launderers go to great lengths particularly to hide the source
of their funds."' Nonetheless, a global effort is essential to force
banks that elude regulations to discontinue managing accounts for
corrupt leaders. If the banks are held accountable for their clients'
illegal activities, there finally will be an incentive to prevent money
laundering. While money laundering is only one aspect of the
problem of grand corruption, eliminating safe hiding places for
kleptocrats to stash their wares is a fundamental step in preventing
grand corruption.
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iii. International Criminal Prosecution
Current world leaders, who have seen their predecessors go
largely unpunished and undeterred in their efforts to amass great
wealth, have little incentive to change the system. National initiatives
or promises to prosecute corrupt officials are greatly limited by local
politics. International law has the potential to hold leaders
responsible before an audience with power to demand change.
One potential step forward in fighting grand corruption is to hold
heads of state liable for their crimes.115 Head-of-state liability is
interconnected with rules of customary international law."6 While
heads of state are normally immune from prosecution as a function of
their official positions, there is emerging international consensus that
they should be liable for serious international law crimes, such as
crimes against humanity."7 Crimes against humanity are defined as
"an attack against any civilian population, where the attack is
widespread or part of a systematic policy." ' 8 There is no requirement
that the attack involve an armed conflict."9 Accordingly, "such
crimes may be committed in the legal sense during relative
peacetime. ' ' 2° Efforts should be made to further the notion amongst
the international community that it is in fact jurisprudentially possible
to prosecute heads of state for kleptocracy before an international
tribunal.21
The idea that heads of state could be held liable for grand
corruption is relatively new, but denying them immunity for atrocious
crimes is not new.22 A head of state who steals millions of dollars
from his citizens and exacerbates extreme poverty has certainly
committed a "particularly heinous international crime."
'123
Prosecuting heads of state for grand corruption will serve as a strong
deterrent for leaders who would otherwise go unpunished. A corrupt
regime will not police or investigate itself, so it is up to the
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international community to do so.
VI. Conclusion
Grand corruption is a heinous and severe crime. The world
community is slowly waking up to the damage it causes and the extent
to which it serves as a profound impediment to poverty eradication.
In the last four years, significant progress has been made in global
efforts to put an end to corruption. The United Nations has passed a
binding convention on corruption, with specific focus on grand
corruption. Both the World Bank and the United States Agency for
International Development have created new strategies which
recognize the problem of grand corruption.
Nonetheless, evidence of significant change has yet to surface.
International legal development still struggles with the reality of
trying to make progress in a country where the entire system is
corrupt. Legal strategies in the context of international law have not
yet been fully tested. Furthermore, politics stands in the way of a
truly honest fight against grand corruption. The international
community must continue to pool resources and promote cooperation
to hold corrupt leaders and their banks responsible in order to truly
address grand corruption. Certainly, if the law is not better utilized to
fight corruption, no amount of international aid or private investment
will make it go away.
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